mas result. For neoliberals, the quality of information in the international system varies significantly. As the quantity and quality of information increase, so do the prospects for cooperation. Crucially, IOs enable states to gather and share important information."1 Thus for neoliberals, IOs do matter, but they matter only as structural constraints on state behavior, not as autonomous actors. Therefore, because neoliberals largely share the realist ontology, they have not fully considered how IOs might be treated as agents of state principals and thus actors-albeit subordinate ones-in their own right.
This shortcoming of neoliberalism is both ironic and unfortunate. Pursuing the question of IOs as agents of their member states would have been the logical next step in applying the theory of the firm to international relations. Recall that Keohane began this application in 1984, noting persuasively how IOs might solve Coase's classic problems of information asymmetries, transaction costs, and the absence of property rights.'2 Once economists had developed the functional theory of the firm, they moved on to problems of its organization, including how shareholders attempt to control managers. However, international relations scholars have only recently begun to take the corresponding step for IOs.13 An explicit application of the theory of the firm to international relations would complement the extant neoliberal theories of IO creation and persistence with a more general theory of IO governance, behavior, and change.'4 This amendment may prove indispensable because, in its present form, neoliberalism simply has no theoretical apparatus to deal with IO agency. If IOs are important for cooperation in international relations because they reduce transaction costs, mitigate information asymmetries, and provide quasi-legal frameworks, then whether and how well IOs perform these tasks should greatly influence prospects for cooperation. If IOs have autonomy from their creators, they may actually undermine the purposes for which they were created. Given enough autonomy, one can even imagine pathological IOs actively sabotaging the interests of the states that created them.15 In fact, this vision of IOs running amok is pre- 14. The first generation of neoliberal theorists were constrained from making this seemingly progressive move in their research program because of their need to demonstrate the weakness of neorealist theory while employing a neorealist ontology. Keohane did deduce important systemic outcomes that were distinct from realist predictions by using Coase's model of transaction costs. But the cases he employed reveal an important limitation of neoliberal theory. For example, Keohane finds the International Energy Agency (IEA) staff doing things that influence the amount and type of international cooperation, and notes "a remarkable delegation of authority" to the IEA. We do not doubt these empirical claims, but we also note the inability of Keohane's neoliberal model to accommodate such IO autonomy. See Keohane 1984. 15. For organizational theorists such as Barnett and Finnemore 1999, IOs are like global Frankensteins terrorizing (or more often benefiting) the international countryside. Once IOs have been created, they take on a life of their own and are largely beyond the control of their creators. Barnett and Finnemore advocate an approach that can "explain both the power of IOs and their propensity for cisely the world that some scholars (and politicians) envision today. Without a theory of IO behavior and reform, neoliberalism has no ability to address such empirical patterns.
Thus neoliberalism finds itself in much the same condition that Coase, Williamson, and other transaction cost economists did during the early 1960s. It is time to apply the insights of the theory of the firm to multilateral cooperation within IOs.16 Below, we propose a parallel and progressive shift within the neoliberal paradigm that would elaborate the microfoundations of international organization. Our model illuminates the conditions under which IOs will be given autonomy to pursue their preferences, and the conditions under which they will be reined in by member governments.
A Principal-Agent Model of International Organization
We thus develop a model of institutional and behavioral change in IOs, based on logic derived from agency theory in microeconomics.17 Member governments (making up the principal) hire an IO (agent) to perform some function that will benefit the members. In this framework, member governments establish the goals that IOs will pursue and then allow the IO to pursue those goals with little interference most of the time. Generally, IOs should be observed to act "on their own." As long as agents are producing policies that are broadly consistent with the preferences of principals, P-A theory suggests that member governments will not pay the significant costs associated with micromanaging the organization. But during periods when member governments and IOs differ with regard to preferred outcomes, we can assess the mechanisms that drive IO institutions and behavior. In our P-A framework, we should observe significant institutional reforms and intervention by the member governments if and only if the IO strays from its principals' mandated objectives or the preferences of member governments change in concert.18 dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior." Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 699. Barnett and Finnemore offer a theoretically coherent explanation for such dysfunctional 10 behavior. For discussions about how organizational theory (or constructivism more generally) can be tested empirically and whether it should be conceived as a complement or an alternative to P-A theory, see Nielson 18. If the preferences of only a subset of members change, IO institutional change will depend on the decision rules within the IO and the relative power of various members.
Previous Arguments
For early agency theorists, the creation of a firm provided its founders with a way to internalize transaction costs and delegate decision-making authority to realize efficiency gains that follow from specialization. However, the structure of a firm presents a problem for its founders: How does one delegate authority without losing control? According to Kiewiet and McCubbins, a principal faces three specific difficulties when delegating.19 First, the agent can "hide information" from the principal whose revelation would hurt the agent and help the principal. Second, the agent can do things behind the principal's back, "concealing actions" that the principal would sanction if known. Third, the principal faces "Madison's dilemma"-in which the need to delegate authority may give powers to the agent that can be used against the principal. Because the interests of principal and agent are never completely coincident, there will always be agency slippage between what the principal wants and what the agent does.
However, the principal is far from powerless. Principals write initial employment contracts, and they can renegotiate-or threaten to renegotiate-those contracts. Although threats and institutional reform may have costs to principals, they can employ these tactics strategically to modify agent behavior. In an efficiently designed P-A relationship, the contract is self-enforcing. That is, institutional constraints induce the self-interested agent to abide by the wishes of the principal.
Principals possess at least four tools to help them design self-enforcing contracts and thus mitigate agency slippage. First, the principal can carefully screen the potential agent when hiring. Such "screening and selection" mechanisms may enable the principal to employ someone whose interests are similar to the principal's, or someone who has demonstrated obedience and diligence in the past. Second, the principal can "monitor" the agent's actions, either directly through "police patrol oversight" mechanisms or indirectly, by inducing third parties to perform the oversight functions and thus mitigate the cost of monitoring through "fire alarm oversight."20 Third, the principal may employ contracting arrangements that include credible commitments to punish or reward the agent for specified behavior. Fourth, the principal can construct checks and balances that require coordination or competition between two or more agents.21 If designed properly, checks and balances can reveal information to the principal about agent behavior and can also inhibit agent behavior that is detrimental to the principal. P-A models have been fruitfully applied in American and comparative political contexts. The most influential findings from this literature demonstrate that the previously widespread view among scholars-that all-powerful bureaucrats often run amok in the policy process-is dramatically overstated, if not false. Because bureaucrats were observed to have a distinctive culture, to be lobbying politicians, to be expanding their range of tasks-in short, to be doing more; and because bureaucracies were growing in size and number, many scholars incorrectly concluded that these organizations were gaining power at the expense of elected officials.22 This "abdication hypothesis" in American and comparative politics parallels recent claims about IOs in the international relations literature.23
P-A Complications and Theoretical Solutions
The perception of "abdication" to agents may persist in the IO literature because IOs introduce a set of complicating factors that the extant P-A literature has not adequately addressed. Initially, models of P-A relationships were kept simpleone principal, one agent-as suggested by our discussion of the literature summarized above. However, this stylized model of delegation imperfectly mirrors the great complexity involved in governing IOs. In particular, such simplifications overlook the problems of common agency and long delegation chains.
Common agency: Collective principal or multiple principals.
A recent literature in political economy addresses the issue of common agency, where principals must solve problems of collective action and incompatible incentives before, and while, they resolve issues of agency slippage.24 Contributors to this literature continue to conflate two analytically distinct situations that may result in important empirical differences. Specifically, as Lyne and Tierney note, a delegation relationship can have one or more principals, and a principal can either be an individual or a corporate entity.25 Hence, when an agent has more than one employment contract with organizationally distinct principals, we say this is a delegation relationship with "multiple principals." When an agent has a single contract with a principal, but the principal happens to be composed of more than one actor, we call this a delegation relationship with a "collective principal."
The most familiar delegation relationships in politics and government involve a collective principal. Voters delegate to politicians, legislators delegate to party leaders, and nation-states delegate to IOs. In all these situations, a group of actors reaches agreement among themselves and then negotiates a contract with an agent to do something. If the group cannot come to an agreement a priori (whether because of restrictive decision rules, cycling, or preference heterogeneity), then they cannot change the status quo. This is true for initial hiring decisions, for proposals to renegotiate the agent's employment contract, or for giving the agent novel authoritative instructions. In all these scenarios, there is a single contract between an agent and the collective principal. However, the individual principals in these models of American politics do not seem to suffer from any internal coordination problems, even though both the House of Representatives and the Senate are themselves collective principals. While this assumption may be reasonable in the case of a domestic legislature organized along party lines, it is less plausible for independent governments attempting coordination within an IO. Within a collective principal, if one actor or some combination of actors within the collective principal has a veto, then any decision to remove the agent or reform the agent's incentives must be preferred to the status quo by the veto player. This makes the status quo stickier than many extant common agency models imply. In the strategic situation discussed below, an agent at the status quo may be insulated from meddling principals, especially if coordination within the collective principal is costly or if any member or group of members with the power to veto a change is inclined to do so.
Ceteris paribus, agency slippage has a tendency to increase with the number of actors doing the delegating.29 As the number of actors grows, coordination within the collective principal gets more complicated. Fortunately, many collective prin- Depending on decision rules, the equilibrium outcome will be somewhere within the combined preference sets of the members of the collective principal, but where exactly is indeterminate without prior knowledge of the status quo and the institutional rules that govern the decisions of principals. The good news is that most IOs have formal decision rules. To the extent that these rules are efficacious, one should be able to deduce behavioral outcomes if one can specify the preferences of principals and the power of the principals defined in terms of voting share.
The Delegation Chain: Proximate Principals and Leapfrogging
The nested P-A relationships that are common to IOs further complicate our use of agency theory. This complication has received even less attention in the extant literature.32 Figure 2 illustrates the numerous P-A relationships that are typical for IOs, with agency slack increasing as the delegation chain grows longer. If there is some slippage at each link in the delegation chain, then the ultimate principals within member countries (citizens) face the possibility that they will pay the costs of membership without receiving the policy payoff promised by the initial delegation.33
One solution to the problem of nested P-A relationships emerges through institutional design. Institutions can be designed so that pressure on agents to alter their behavior is only effective if it operates through the "proximate principal"-that is, the principal with the formal authority to hire, fire, or otherwise alter the agent's employment contract. This is so even if portions of the "ultimate principal"-say, voters within member countries-are the ones demanding change. The proximate principal may be designed to receive the petitions of its immediate principals in the chain of delegation, aggregate those demands, sort them, and re- (IO management and staff) that are more than one link removed from the ultimate principal (member-country electorates) in the P-A chain will not be equipped with mechanisms to discern whether activists' demands are representative of the distant principal as a whole.36 Such institutionalized insulation actually ensures that IO agents will not change standard operating procedures without a clear indication from member governments that such changes are desired. The proximate principal will thus prove most important when agents are sifting through conflicting demands for behavioral change.
Thus at both domestic and international levels we adopt a strictly formal notion of power, which flows through authoritative rule structures specified in constitutions, articles of agreement, or charters. This approach may seem blasphemous to those familiar with the literature on IOs, in which readers are constantly reminded that formal rules and codified treaties often obscure the actual distribution of power and rules of the game within a given I0.37 However, the formal approach adopted here allows us to deduce a clear set of behavioral expectations and aggregate outcomes-something that is missing from much empirical work on IOs. If formal rules are not efficacious within IOs, then our hypotheses are likely to be falsified.
Hypotheses and Methods
A number of hypotheses that relate to collective principals, multiple principals, preference heterogeneity among principals, and the amount and type of agency slippage can be deduced from our P-A argument, but many of these hypotheses are better tested by employing statistical methods on cross-sectional quantitative data from different IOs.38 In this article we are interested in demonstrating the plausibility of the P-A model by closely tracing the process of reform efforts and illuminating the causal links between our independent and dependent variables. To these ends we deduce the following hypotheses: H1. When agent behavior diverges from principal preferences, credible threats by the principal to recontract with the agent will reduce the gap between the principal's demands and the agent's subsequent behavior. However, behav-36. As Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien explained in response to calls for greater "democratization" by anti-globalization demonstrators in Quebec City, "This meeting is the result of a democratic process. Each of the thirty-four governments represented here is responsible for the well-being of its own people and each government at this meeting has been democratically elected. Who elected these protesters?" MSNBC news broadcast, 21 April 2001.
37. In a typical review of this literature we are told that "informal power" and weakly institutionalized authority structures at the international level "make it difficult for these theories to offer accurate explanations." Middlemas 1995. He may be right. But we note that Middlemas never actually tests hypotheses derived from any theory that assumes the efficacy of formal rules. We believe it is more prudent to empirically test such theories before discarding them out of hand.
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ioral change will be shallow and short-lived unless institutional reforms are enacted to "lock-in" these changes.
H2. When agent behavior diverges from principal preferences, the probability of institutional reform and the amount of institutional reform will rise as the preferences of multiple principals converge or as the preferences of members within a collective principal converge.
H3
. Institutional reform will induce change in agent behavior that more closely conforms to principal demands.
H4. Pressure on the agent from any actor other than the proximate principal will not result in significant behavioral change.
To evaluate the strength of these hypotheses we carefully trace the processes and reveal the causal mechanisms of institutional reform and behavioral change at the World Bank. This task requires a method that can reveal multiple steps within a causal chain, from principals' preference changes/convergence to recontracting threats to IO organizational reform to IO behavioral change. Hence, we employ a qualitative case-study research method. For three reasons, the World Bank presents a difficult case for our P-A model. First, the opportunities for hidden action and hidden information are extensive. The Bank's staff of more than 10,000 full-time employees and its worldwide operations make it difficult for principals to monitor.39 Second, unlike most IOs, the Bank generates enough revenue to cover its entire operating budget independently. Also, roughly 80 percent of the money it lends is raised in private capital markets where the Bank enjoys a AAA bond rating.40 Such figures suggest that the Bank, unlike IOs relying on dues, enjoys significant financial autonomy from member countries. Third, for most of the Bank's history, professional economists and engineers on staff have framed reports and proposals in highly technical language, often obscuring the actions taken or the anticipated outcomes.4' Also, until quite recently it was very difficult for Bank board members (or the government officials who appointed them) to obtain detailed project documents more than a few weeks before the board vote on a loan, making oversight periods very brief. Bank reports were kept secret in the name of preserving the sovereignty of borrowers.42
But no matter how carefully "difficult" cases are selected, readers should be skeptical of attempts to generalize from a single case. We attempt to mitigate the small-n problem in several ways. First, while we do not increase the number of observations by looking across space at other multilateral development banks,43 we do expand the n by looking across time. By examining institutional and behavioral outcomes at the Bank over a twenty-year period, we increase the number of observable implications for our theory. Of course, we do not claim that each year is independent from all previous years. However, if we encounter variance over time in our core explanatory variables-principals' preference change and convergence, credible threats to recontract, and institutional reform-then each instance of variation expands the n. To increase robustness, we employ multiple measures to gauge variation in our dependent variables. We assess lending behavior by measuring the portions of money lent in various categories from year to year, by measuring the percentage of loans that fall into each category, and by employing three-year moving averages for both measures. We examine each aspect of institutional reform over time. Moreover, our model entails a causal chain. Principals' threats engender institutional reform, which results in behavioral change. Our model is strengthened if we find evidence suggesting that more significant behavioral changes in lending follow from more significant institutional reform.44
Case Study: Environmental Reform at the World Bank Until the early 1980s, the World Bank's task managers and project officers did just about as they pleased.45 Most politicians and other elites within donor countries believed the Bank was the organization best suited to meet the lending needs of world development, and therefore left it alone. As importantly, the Bank was not engaged in activities that fundamentally conflicted with the interests of the electoral coalitions holding power in the West.
Ironically, during the 1970s the World Bank was often seen as a leader among IOs on questions of environmental protection. It was one of the only IOs to explicitly discuss environmental issues and (at least rhetorically) incorporate them into policy decisions. But with only three environmental specialists on staff until 1983, the Bank's Office of Environmental Affairs typically rubber-stamped projects late in the approval process, only occasionally making recommendations to reduce environmental "externalities."46 Despite the public perception that the Bank was more sensitive to environmental issues than other IOs, the environmental staff, 51. The United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, China, and Saudi Arabia.
52. In fact, we would argue that a U.S. withdrawal from the World Bank-initiated either by the president or Congress-would fundamentally alter the Bank itself. Given the probable shift in priorities, personnel, and headquarters that a withdrawal of the hegemon would entail, the organization that emerged would be a fundamentally different one. The implications of a U.S. withdrawal anchor our claim that both the U.S. president and Congress are independent principals of the Bank.
53. This would hold for any other member country-legislature that exists independently of the executive and can unilaterally recontract with the Bank. This caveat applies to France during periods of cohabitation, and to most Latin American countries. France's voting share is slightly more than 25 percent of the U.S. share. All Latin American countries, even Brazil and Argentina, are much lower. Hence, this multiple principals concept applies most strongly in the case of the United States. course).54 Finally, the Congress can end U.S. membership in the Bank by statute (with the same veto caveat applying). Interestingly, the Congress has no direct budgetary authority over the U.S. executive director or the executive director's office, both of which are funded by the Bank. Hence, the U.S. Congress (as represented in Figure 3 ) has numerous formal sources of authority that allow it to unilaterally recontract with the World Bank, directly through appropriations and membership decisions, and indirectly through its authority over the U.S. executive director.
The Bank thus faces both a collective principal and multiple principals. When preferences diverge on its board, reform of the Bank proves difficult. Also, disagreement between the U.S. Congress and president can give the Bank additional room to maneuver. However, when the preferences of the board members and the two U.S. government branches come together, our model predicts that this convergence will constrain Bank behavior much more tightly. In the rash of finger pointing that followed this debacle, the Bank proved an easy target.57 Environmental NGOs and a growing number of scientists began to pressure the Bank through direct lobbying of staff and management, by encouraging press coverage, through protests in both Brazil and Washington, D.C., and through testimony in U.S. congressional hearings.58 Yet, despite a loud and sustained lobbying effort, these groups were unable to stop the project or convince the Bank to halt disbursements on the loans. Similar fiascos following other Bank projects, particularly a comparable Bank-funded transmigration project in Indonesia, amplified the criticisms from the environmental community but did not trigger any change in Bank policies or projects. In fact, Bank officials grew creative in the ways they deflected criticism and ignored critics.59 After almost three years of well-reasoned critiques, a mountain of scientific evidence and a complete lack of progress, frustrated environmentalists convinced the U.S. Congress to take action.60
U.S. Congress Threatens, Treasury Adds Pressure
An odd coalition of environmentalists and fiscal conservatives in Congress joined forces to pressure the Bank. Robert Kasten (R-Wis.), chair of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee, fit within both camps. He desired a reduction in Bank-funded projects that caused environmental problems, but he also believed the U.S. Congress should closely scrutinize all money allocated to IOs. Kasten had held multiple hearings on MDB lending and the environment from 1983-85.61 But more public airing of project foibles had little or no impact on the status of the Rondonia project, others like it, or Bank policy in general. In order to change Bank policy, the management at the Bank needed to believe that those making all the noise could give them something they wanted or take away something that they needed. Senator Kasten understood this; and he was in a position to withhold billions of dollars.
The jugular at the World Bank was the IDA, which makes no-interest loans on a fifty-year repayment schedule to the world's poorest countries. Unlike the larger International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which actually turns a profit, the IDA relies on donor contributions for its allocations. At the behest of environmental groups, Kasten and his congressional allies targeted that Bank vulnerability. The U.S. Congress explicitly threatened to withhold further Even when facing threats of funding cuts, Bank responses were sluggish.64 Subsequently, the U.S. Treasury, the second of the U.S. multiple principals, grew serious about environmental reform at the Bank. The second Reagan administration had become more friendly than the first Reagan administration both to environmental interests and to multilateral development banks. Treasury Secretary James Baker also needed the Bank to manage the Latin American debt crisis. Congressional approval of an IBRD capital increase was vital to the success of the Baker plan for resolving the debt crisis. Now, there were two funding vulnerabilities for the Bank: the IDA replenishment and the IBRD capital increase. Baker thus took Kasten's concerns seriously and added the Treasury's voice to those in Congress calling for environmental reforms at the Bank.65 The interests of the multiple principals had converged.
The subsequent U.S. pressure was more than rhetorical. On 19 June 1986, the United States became the first country ever to vote against a Bank project on environmental grounds. As Alternate Director Hugh Foster asked the Bank's board before casting his negative vote on the massive Brazil Power Sector loan, "How much confidence can we have that it will be carried out conscientiously when the same [Brazilian government] institutions will be implementing a series of environmental disasters at the very same time?"66 Despite U.S. opposition, the loan was approved by the board.
Although passage of the loan certainly indicates that the members of the collective principal were divided on the need for serious environmental reform, the loss actually strengthened the resolve of Kasten and his allies in the U.S. Congress to cut IDA financing. Further coordinated efforts of the U.S. legislative and executive branches enhanced the credibility of the threat to IDA funding.67 Moreover, at this time, interests of other members of the collective principal-notably the Nordic countries, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom-were also converging around environmental reforms at the Bank. However, these other directors 62 boosting staff from a half-dozen people to more than eighty members charged with performing more stringent environmental assessments of projects. In addition, Conable promised to create a new category of free-standing environmental loans. There was no commitment to reducing the dirty "traditional" loans in energy and transportation that were at the heart of the environmental disasters of the 1980s, but Conable did initiate a process that made the Bank's environmental policies more stringent (at least on paper). Over the next several years, the Bank did delay loan disbursements on some of the most controversial projects. However, these actions did little to alter the environmentalists' perceptions of the Bank.70 After the 1987 reforms, the Bank increased the number of environmental loans. But many NGOs questioned whether these new loans were in fact "environmental," rather than traditional sector loans with new labels.71 The incentives of task managers had not been altered by the financial threats of donors, so the Bank continued to favor large (and dirty) traditional loans. For many Bank critics, the behavioral changes that followed 1987 were a step in the right direction, but a very small one.72
One reason that the 1987 reforms may have failed to alter core Bank practice was that the threats had been contingent on short-term behavioral changes rather than institutional changes. The loan approval process was largely un- This move conforms closely to the fire-alarm mechanisms noted above.89 It gave numerous private and public groups an opportunity to bring outside information to the inspection panel and thus the executive board. Now board members found it much easier to get information about the likely impacts of Bank projects before the projects were implemented, as well as information about the conduct of their agents during the implementation phase.90
Despite opposition from Bank staff and some borrowing countries, the board enacted sunshine practices and other reporting requirements at the Bank, substantially opening records and documents to the public that had previously been sealed. Since 1994, all project managers have been required to file, and periodically update, a public information document (PID). To ensure that interested societal groups could get relevant information about Bank projects, the board mandated that each PID would contain a section devoted to "environmental aspects" of the project. SARs-now including environmental assessments-were also made public after 1994.91 These and other sunshine practices were purposely designed as fire-alarm mechanisms that would allow the board to closely monitor its agents: the Bank staff and management.92
For good measure, the board increased its police-patrol oversight activities as well. Before 1994, the board received project documents mere weeks before a vote would be taken. This dramatically reduced the probability of any negative decisions by the board, since halting or substantially altering a loan at that late stage of the project cycle would be quite costly and could even shake the credibility of the Bank. After the 1993-94 changes to the loan approval process, board members would be involved early in the planning stages of projects, and they began to exercise their option to question or suggest changes to projects long before they reached the decision phase.93 As Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, note, Issues of accountability and discipline were also complicated by the actions of the Board. Although management held the initiative for bringing projects to the board and the board never turned down any management proposal, it now had influence before projects arrived and in collective discussion of future projects.94 More important than the fact that the board was hiring scientists, rather than exclusively economists and engineers, was that these scientists were no longer concentrated in the "ghetto" of the World Bank that was the D.C.-based Environment Department or the Regional Environment Divisions. Since 1994, each project with potential environmental impact has been assigned an environmental project manager (typically a non-economist) who is required to assess the environmental impact of each project and include a written evaluation to be sent to the board with other project documents. Having environmental scientists involved in project planning, approval, and implementation is likely to ensure that members of the board get more than mere environmental rhetoric from task managers. Since 1994 board members have received better and more timely information about the environmental impact of Bank projects because the administrative procedures that they passed in 1993 placed numerous checks on the authority of task managers.
Disbursement for any project categorized as environmentally sensitive A or B types now requires two distinct environmental assessments. First, during the project planning phase an environmental impact assessment (EIA) must be submitted and a pilot program must be designed to test for environmental degradation. After data is collected during the pilot phase, a second EIA must be submitted for the project as a whole. This larger EIA reveals practices that negatively affect the environment and recommends alternatives. In the absence of alternatives, the EIA evaluates the cost and feasibility of mitigation options.97 Loan disbursements cannot commence until these administrative procedures are completed and the documents submitted to the board by authorized environmental staff. This is a direct applica- In nearly all cases, the statistical trends are stronger and more significant for the 1994-2000 period than for the 1987-93 period, suggesting that sectoral finance patterns at the Bank changed more profoundly after the 1993 reforms than they did after the much-heralded 1987 reforms. These statistical results reinforce the inferences we make following our case study and offer additional support for our model. Significant behavioral changes that stick follow institutional reforms.
Conclusion
We attempt to accomplish four important tasks in this article. First, we address an interesting empirical puzzle in international relations: How and why did the World Bank initially resist reform, and how did it ultimately come to change its organizational structure and its lending behavior? We offer an agency theory explanation for the observed empirical pattern. Further, we conduct qualitative and statistical analysis of the model. Second, we provide the first overall (descriptive) statistical analysis of environmental lending at the World Bank and supplement it with an assessment of the entire portfolio.120 We find it remarkable that no one has done such work during the past ten years, especially considering the mountain of qualitative work done by both academics and activists on these subjects. Not only does this policy debate suffer from a lack of quantitative analysis, but also from an almost complete lack of quantitative data. We help to remedy the latter problem by compiling a large database that bears on various aspects of this debate.121
Third, we explain why the next logical step in the neoliberal institutionalist research agenda should parallel a shift that took place in the economic theory of the firm decades ago. Because neoliberal regime theorists based many of their insights on the early work of Coase, it makes sense to pursue a parallel shift toward agency theory in IR in the hope that it will be as productive.
Fourth, in this spirit we outline a P-A model of international organization and discuss some of the special difficulties that we expect agency theory to encounter 120. Our findings strongly suggest that Bank critics are wrong when they conclude that the Bank is conducting business as usual when it comes to the environment. Environmental lending has increased significantly since 1987, the Bank has institutionalized checks on the dysfunctional behavior of its staff, the Bank has dramatically decreased lending for traditional "dirty" loans, and member governments have significantly increased their ability to monitor and sanction behavior that is not consistent with official Bank lending practices.
121. Further data collection efforts have produced: A database on voting shares in the eight largest international financial institutions from date of origin through 2000; a database of all MDB loans by type, year and organization over the past twenty years; and an environmental policy index for 122 countries from 1980-2000. We are currently extending our database on "mainstreamed" environmental lending by recoding line items in project documents before 1994. Without such data it is difficult to interpret changes in environmental lending following the 1994 reforms. Finally, we are gathering data on personnel assignments within the Bank and administrative spending by department. These data will help us to conduct much more precise tests of the P-A model at each step in the chain of delegation.
when it is applied to IOs. In fact, our insights about the role of a collective principal, multiple principals, and proximate principals may be germane to researchers in American and comparative politics, whose subjects are either connected by multiple links in a delegation chain or who fit the definition of common agency. Hence, we have not merely employed an existing model to address an empirical puzzle in IR, but have also suggested insights applicable to the broader literature on agency theory.
